German Military Reform

Immediately following the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz unveiled his now infamous Zeitenwende Speech, a watershed moment for the German Military. With this speech Scholz announced a special fund of €100bn to bolster and modernise the German Military and reverse its previously cautious defence policy. In the present day, this funding has materialised as €71.8bn (2.01% of GDP) – according to the current NATO forecast. 1992 was the last time that Germany had spent above 2% of its GDP for its military, with the cold war years reaching over 3%. This announcement comes following US Presidential contender Donald Trump’s statement saying that under his leadership the US would not be keen to defend NATO countries who do not meet the 2% spending target. Körber-Stiftung reveal that 72% of respondents agree with the German government’s goal of a 2% of GDP military expenditure. However, 71% of respondents had also stated that they oppose Germany taking on a position of military leadership in Europe. Boris Pistorius, the German Defence Minister, affirmed Germany’s commitment to the spending target in a statement, as well as pushing back against opposition suggestions that Germany should increase its Special Military Defence Fund from €100bn to €300bn, suggesting that the regular budgetary amount should be increased instead, to allow for better long-term planning.

The German Military currently faces a multitude of problems which affect its combat effectiveness. For example, there is a general lack of recruitment, with recruitment figures dropping by 11% since last year, with over 18,000 vacant positions. Compulsory military service was abolished in 2011 by Angela Merkel’s government, with politicians arguing that professional armed forces are needed over conscripts. Even with the Zeitenwende, compulsory military service is unlikely to return, partially due to the widespread lack of staff, buildings and equipment:

To address this issue, Germany is considering to open recruitment to foreign nationals. Under existing law, only German citizens are allowed to join the military proper, with some roles being open to non-citizens who were born and raised in Germany. Foreign recruits can help meet the strong demand, and this complements plans to recruit an additional 20,000 troops in response to potential growing threats. It is believed that Germany will prioritise recruitment from EU member states, although the country has not explicitly denied the possibility of recruiting from other countries. This strategy has yielded much success for countries such as the UK, who are able to recruit from Commonwealth countries, or France who have an established Foreign Legion. Germany will likely also see success from a similar venture, and narrowing recruitment to EU countries may inadvertently also provide some momentum for the idea of a pan-EU military.

Germany has been the second largest state donor of military aid to Ukraine, doubling potential aid in 2024 to €8bn. This will be financed using the €100bn originally set aside by Scholz in his Zeitenwende speech to modernise the military, amid funding concerns. Whilst this affirms commitments to Ukraine, this may come at the cost of other German policy ambitions, such as the green energy transition, with Scholz admitting that “it is clear that we will have to do with substantially less money to achieve these goals.” Israel has also received a huge amount of German military support, with 10 times more exports to Israel in 2023 than 2022 at over €300m. 85% of military export licenses from Germany to Israel in 2023 were approved after the October 7 attacks. Additionally, Germany is moving to deploy 4,800 German soldiers to Lithuania to begin training in 2025, with the aim of being combat ready by 2027. These developments would have been unthinkable prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Scholz had also stressed that German and EU arms manufacturers must pivot towards mass production of arms as the Russia-Ukraine War had exposed the current vulnerability of EU militaries meeting the demands for ammunition. Rheinmetall, for example, has already begun to expand their production by ordering the construction of a new factory in Unterluess. This plant aims to produce the entire value chain for artillery ammunition, and seeks to help cover the increased demand of the Bundeswehr by producing an additional 200,000 shells annually.